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Abstract
Key predistribution for wireless sensor networks has been a challenging field of research because stringent resource
constraints make the key predistribution schemes difficult to implement. Despite this, key predistribution scheme is
regarded as the best option for key management in wireless sensor networks. Here, the authors have proposed a new
key predistribution scheme. This scheme exhibits better performance than existing schemes of its kind. Moreover, our
scheme ensures constant time of key establishment between two nodes. We provide some bounds on the resiliency
of this scheme.
Next, we use this new key predistribution scheme in a grid-group deployment of sensor nodes. The entire
deployment zone is broken into square regions. The sensor nodes falling within a single square region can
communicate directly. Sensor nodes belonging to different square regions can communicate by means of special
nodes deployed in each of the square region. We measure the resiliency in terms of fraction of links disconnected as
well as fraction of nodes and regions disconnected. We show that our key predistribution scheme when applied to
grid-group deployment performs better than standard models in existence.
1 Introduction
Key predistribution in wireless sensor networks has
attracted attention of researchers for a decade. Key
predistribution schemes are classified into two groups
viz. probabilistic key predistribution and deterministic
key predistribution. In probabilistic key predistribution
scheme, as the name implies, the keys are randomly drawn
from a large pool of keys and are placed into the individual
sensor nodes. This scheme does not ensure full con-
nectivity between nodes. However, due to this scheme’s
randomness, it does ensure resiliency against selective
node capture attack. Some probabilistic schemes can be
found in [1-3]. The main disadvantage of probabilistic key
predistribution schemes are that they do not ensure full
connectivity between each and every pair of nodes. On the
other hand, in deterministic key predistribution scheme,
a deterministic method is employed to load the keys into
the sensor nodes. This scheme may or may not offer full
connectivity between every pair of nodes of the Wireless
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Sensor Network (WSN). Several deterministic key pre-
distribution schemes have been proposed by researchers.
Blom [4] proposed a scheme for key for pairwise key
establishment in a group of users. This scheme, though
primarily not intended for WSNs, was later used for key
establishment in WSN. A symmetric polynomial-based
scheme was proposed by Blundo et al. in [5]. Key predis-
tribution schemes based on combinatorial design can be
found in [6-12].
Combinatorial designs have been extensively used in
deterministic key management. Mitchel and Piper [13]
first used this in key distribution. In combinatorial design-
based key distribution, a set system is used. The elements
of the set system are regarded as the keys. A block is
regarded as the key ring of a node. Çamptepe and Yener
[6,7] were first to use combinatorial designs for key predis-
tribution in sensor networks. They used projective geom-
etry and generalized quadrangles. Lee and Stinson [8,9]
used transversal designs for key distribution. Chakrabarti
et al. [11] proposed a hybrid key predistribution scheme
by randomly merging the blocks of the transversal design
proposed by Lee and Stinson. Their merging technique
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enhances the resiliency of the key predistribution scheme
of Lee and Stinson. Three designs were used by Dong
et al. [14]. They also proposed a class of key predistribu-
tion scheme based on orthogonal array [15]. Blackburn
et al. [16] proposed Costas arrays and distinct difference
configuration. Product construction was used by [17]. The
scheme is based on the product of key distribution scheme
and set systems. They deduce the conditions of the set
systems that provide optimum connectivity and resiliency
of the network. Ruj and Roy proposed several schemes
using partially balanced design, transversal design, and
Reed-Solomon codes [10,18,19].
Key predistribution in wireless sensor networks using
deployment knowledge was first studied by Liu and Ning
[3]. They proposed two predistribution schemes both of
which took advantage of the deployment knowledge of
sensor nodes. The first scheme called the closest pair-
wise scheme was a modification of the pairwise key pre-
distribution scheme. The second predistribution scheme
uses the polynomial-based key predistribution scheme of
Blundo et al. [5].
Several research works followed, e.g., [18,20-27]. In Du
et al. scheme [20,21], the sensors are deployed in groups
at a single point of deployment. The probability density
function of the ultimate position of all sensors in a group
are the same. They used multiple space Blom scheme [4]
for key predistribution.
Yu and Guan [28,29] studied key predistribution
schemes using deployment knowledge and compared the
effect of deployment on triangular, hexagonal, and square
grids. Huang et al. [24,25] proposed a grid-group-based
key predistribution scheme. These schemes are perfectly
secure to selective and random node capture attack. Here,
the deployment area is divided into smaller rectangular
zones of the same size. Every rectangular area contains
equal number of sensors deployed uniformly in that zone.
The keys in the sensors are deployed following multi-
ple space Blom scheme similar to Du et al. scheme [20].
Each sensor node chooses keys from two key spaces such
that no more than c sensors are chosen from the same
key space, thus eliminating the possibility of node capture
attacks. In [23], Zhou et al. discussed a key predistribution
scheme where sensor nodes are mobile. There are static
sensor which are deployed in groups. There are mobile
collectors which are used to collect and aggregate sen-
sor data and forward to the base station. The mobility of
collectors enhance the data consistency.
Ruj and Roy [18] proposed a key predistribution for
grid-group-based deployment. In this scheme, the deploy-
ment area is divided into smaller square regions. There are
n2 such smaller regions. There are two types of nodes viz.
common nodes and agents. Their scheme offers full con-
nectivity between the set of agents of the regions within
the communication range.
Bag proposed a key predistribution scheme using the
deployment knowledge in [30]. Here, the author con-
sidered a three-dimensional deployment zone where the
sensor nodes are deployed not only along the length and
breadth of the deployment zone but also along the height
of the deployment zone.
In this paper, we propose a key predistribution scheme
for homogeneous wireless sensor networks using the
scheme of Blom [4] as well as symmetric balanced incom-
plete block design (SBIBD). The main advantage of using
this scheme for key predistribution is that for this scheme,
the adversary needs to capture large number of nodes in
order to compromise all the keys in an uncompromised
node. In other words, in order to disconnect an uncap-
tured node from all other nodes, the adversary needs
to capture many more nodes than the other standard
schemes.
Then, we use this new key predistribution scheme in
a grid-group deployment of sensor nodes. A grid-group
deployment refers to such a deployment where the entire
deployment zone is broken into smaller two-dimensional
square regions giving rise to an n × n grid-group struc-
ture. Equal number of sensor nodes are deployed in each
of the smaller square regions of the deployment zone.
Sensor nodes deployed inside one smaller square region
forms a group. Sensor nodes within the same group com-
municate more frequently than a pair of nodes falling in
two different groups. This is driven by the fact that sen-
sor nodes in proximity to each other communicate more
frequently than distant nodes. Sensor nodes deployed in
this fashion grid form a heterogeneous network. This type
of deployment scheme is applied in battlefields where
sensors belonging to a compromised zone need to be
completely disconnected from the rest of the network.
Because if an adversary compromises an area, all the sen-
sor nodes deployed in that area are considered to be
captured.
This type of deployment is proposed by Liu and Ning
[3,22]. There are two types of sensor nodes in this het-
erogeneous network. They mainly differ in resource. One
type of nodes have a low amount of storage capacity,
power, and computational power, and the other type
of nodes are richer in the amount of computational
resources that they posses.We shall use the name ‘supern-
ode’ for the nodes which are more powerful than common
nodes. Common sensors belonging to one region contain
a set of keys that are completely disjoint from the sensors
in some other region. This ensures that even if one region
is totally disconnected, the other regions are not affected.
For each sensor node, the keys are preloaded in such a way
that all the nodes belonging to a particular square region
(group) can communicate with each other directly. Sen-
sor nodes belonging to different square regions (group)
communicate through two or more supernodes.
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Our general key predistribution scheme offers better
resiliency than the schemes in [4,6,7]. For example, in key
predistribution scheme by Blom [4], the adversary can
compromise all the keys of the entireWSNmerely by cap-
turing c nodes, where c is the security parameter of the
design. However, in our scheme, the adversary can only
compromise few links by capturing c nodes. Our scheme
also offers better resiliency than [6,7] in terms of the num-
ber of links that get exposed when some nodes are com-
promised. In both key predistribution schemes based on
symmetric BIBD and generalized quadrangles in [6,7], the
attacker can compromise many key links between pairs of
uncaptured nodes by capturing a single node. However, in
our scheme, the attacker needs to capture multiple nodes
for compromising the key links between some pairs of
nodes.We have compared our scheme with [18] and other
similar schemes on the basis of fraction of links that gets
exposed when some nodes get captured by the adversary.
This is a well-known measure of the resiliency of a key
predistribution scheme. Our scheme is shown to exhibit
the best performance as far as the resiliency is concerned.
The scheme of Ruj and Roy in [18] uses three times the
number of supernodes we use in our scheme for full con-
nectivity. Our scheme offers better resiliency using less
number of supernodes.
2 Preliminaries
Here, we discuss some mathematical structures that we
have used in our key predistribution scheme. Table 1
provides the meaning of different notations used in this
section and in the next section.
2.1 Combinatorial design
A design [31] is a two tuple (X,A) where X is a set of
varieties, andA is a set of subsets of X:
A = {x : x ⊆ X}
Table 1 Table of notations
Notations
X The set of varieties of the design
A The set of blocks of the design
x1, . . . , xv The varieties of X
B1, . . . , Bb Blocks ofA
GF(q) The finite field of q elements
α The primitive element of GF(q)
G A c × r matrix as defined below
t The total number of nodes in deployment
p A prime power where t ≤ p2 + p + 1
N The set of nodes in deployment
f One to one mapN → A
Di c × c symmetric matrices over GF(q) for i = 1, 2, . . . , v
A (v, b, r, k, λ)-BIBD is a design satisfying these proper-
ties:
1. |X| = v.
2. |A| = b.
3. ∀B ∈ A, |B| = k.
4. ∀x ∈ X, |{B : B ∈ A, x ∈ B}| = r.
5. ∀x, y ∈ X, x = y, |{B : B ∈ A, x, y ∈ B}| = λ.
A (v, b, r, k, λ)-BIBD, where v = b is called a symmetric
BIBD or SBIBD.
It can be shown that in a symmetric BIBD, k = r [31].
A (n2 + n+ 1, n+ 1, 1)-BIBD with n ≥ 2 is called a pro-
jective plane of order n. It can be proven (Theorem 2.10,
[31]) that for every prime power q ≥ 2, there exists a sym-
metric (q2 + q + 1, q + 1, 1)-BIBD i.e., a projective plane
of order q.
2.1.1 Construction of SBIBD
Çamptepe and Yener used mutually orthogonal Latin
squares in constructing the key predistribution scheme
of [6]. Another construction of the same scheme can be
found in [32]. Let V3(q) be the set of a three-dimensional
vector space over a finite field Fq of q elements. A projec-
tive geometry PG(2, q) over a finite field Fq is defined like
the following:
• The points are given by the one-dimensional
subspaces of V3(q).
• The lines are given by the two-dimensional subspaces
of V3(q).
• A point belongs to a line if the corresponding one-
dimensional subspace of the point is contained in the
two-dimensional subspace corresponding to the line.
• Two lines are incident to each other iff the
intersection of the corresponding two-dimensional
subspaces of them is a nonempty one-dimensional
subspace.
It can be shown that there are (q3−1)/(q−1) or q2+q+1
number of distinct subspaces of dimension one of V3(q)
[32]. Similarly, the number of distinct subspaces of dimen-
sion two of V3(q) is also q2 +q+ 1. Each two-dimensional
subspace contains q + 1 distinct one-dimensional sub-
spaces. The intersection of two-dimensional subspaces is
a one-dimensional subspace of V3(q). So, the number of
points and lines in PG(2, q) is q2+q+1. Every line contains
q + 1 number of points. So, taking points as varieties and
lines as block PG(2, q) is a symmetric (q2 + q+ 1, q+ 1, 1)
BIBD.
Since the lines of PG(2, q) are two-dimensional sub-
spaces of V3(q), we can represent each block by the
basis of the subspaces they correspond to. The basis of a
two-dimensional subspace of V3(q) contains exactly two
elements. So, each block in PG(2, q) will be identified by
two elements of V3(q).
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Similarly, the points of PG(2, q) are one-dimensional
subspaces of V3(q). So, every variety of (q2 + q + 1, q +
1, 1) SBIBD can be represented by the basis of the one-
dimensional subspace it belongs to.
Let L1 = {(1, s, t) : s, t ∈ GF(q)}
L2 = {(0, 1, s) : s ∈ GF(q)}
L3 = {(0, 0, 1)}
Let, S = L1 ∪ L2 ∪ L3.
|S| = q2 + q + 1.
It can be shown that each element of S is a basis of a
distinct one-dimensional subspace of V3(q). Throughout
this article, we shall represent the q2 + q + 1 number of
varieties of the (q2+q+1, q+1, 1) SBIBD by the elements
of S .
2.1.2 Shared variety discovery of (q2 +q+1, q+1, 1) SBIBD
Any two blocks of a symmetric (q2+q+1, q+1, 1) BIBD do
share one and unique variety. Given a (q2 + q+ 1, q+ 1, 1)
SBIBD, Algorithm 1 finds the common variety of two
blocks of the design. This algorithm uses the basis of the
nullspace of A.x = 0. This basis can be computed using
Gauss-Jordan elimination method [33,34] in a constant
time. Therefore, the runtime of Algorithm 1 is O(1).
Algorithm 1 Computing the shared variety between two
blocks of (q2 + q + 1, q + 1, 1) SBIBD.
Require: Basis of block 1 {(a1, b1, c1), (a2, b2, c2)}.
Basis of block 2 {(a′1, b′1, c′1), (a′2, b′2, c′2)}.





a1 a2 −a′1 −a′2
b1 b2 −b′1 −b′2











Find the basis of the nullspace A.x = 0.
Let this basis be given by (β1,β2,β3,β4).
a = a1β1 + a2β2
b = b1β1 + b2β2
c = c1β1 + c2β2
if a = 0 then
The identifier of the common variety is
(1, a−1b, a−1c).
else
if b = 0 then
The identifier of the common variety is (0, 1, b−1c).
else
The identifier of the common variety is (0, 0, 1).
end if
end if
2.2 Key predistribution using combinatorial design
Once we have a (v, b, r, k, λ)-design (X,A), we can map it
to a key predistribution scheme in the following way:
Let K be a set of v keys.
N be a set of b nodes in the WSN.
LetA = {B1,B2, . . . ,Bb} be the blocks of the design.
Let f : K → X be a map and g : N → A be another
map.
For each Bi ∈ A, i = 1, 2, . . . , b and
∀aj ∈ X, j = 1, 2, . . . , v if aj ∈ Bi and both f −1(aj)
and g−1(Bi) exist, load key f (aj) into node g(Bi).
In plain language, what we do here is to use varieties
as keys and blocks as node. A node corresponding to a
block contains all the keys corresponding to the varieties
that the particular block contains. Two nodes will have a
common key if and only if the corresponding blocks do
share at least one common variety. Again, the number of
keys in a node will be equal to the number of varieties in a
block that corresponds to the node.
2.3 Blom’s scheme
Blom [4] proposed a scheme for key predistribution where
the members of a group can establish pairwise keys. Let
N be the size of the network. The distribution server first
chooses a c × N matrix G over a finite field GF(q). The
matrix G is considered to be a public information. Now,
the distribution server constructs a c×c symmetric matrix
D over GF(q). This matrix is a private information of the
system. Now, the server computes the c × N matrix A,
where A = (DG)T , T being the transposition operator.
Now, AG = (DG)TG = GTDTG = GTDG = GTAT =
(AG)T .
Thus, AG is a symmetric matrix. Let K = AG, we know
that Kij = Kji, where Kij is the element in K located in
the ith row and jth column. Kij (or Kji) is the pairwise key
between node Ui and node Uj. To carry out the above
computation, nodes Ui and Uj should be able to com-
pute Kij and Kji, respectively. This can be easily achieved
using the following key predistribution scheme, for w =
1, 2, . . . ,N ,
• Store the wth row of matrix A in node Uw.
• Store the wth column of matrix G in node Uw.
Now, if two nodes (say Ux and Uy ) want to communi-
cate, they need to establish a common key. Node Ux has
row x of A and column x ofG. NodeUy has row y of A and
column y ofG. Now , they can establish a pairwise key this
way:
• Node Ux and Uy exchange column x and column y of
matrix G, respectively.
• NodeUx calculatesKxy= (row x of A). (column y of G).
• NodeUy calculatesKyx = (row y of A). (column x of G).
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The matrix G is a public information. Therefore, the
rows of G could be sent without encryption. Since K is a
symmetric matrix, Kxy = Kyx. Hence, Kxy can be used as
the common key between the two nodes.
2.3.1 c-secure property
It has been proved that the above scheme is c-secure [4],
i.e., if any c + 1 columns of G are linearly independent;
then, no member other than Ux and Uy can compute Kxy
or Kyx if no more than cmembers are compromised.
2.3.2 A construction formatrix G
We note that any c+ 1 columns of G [35] must be linearly
independent in order to achieve the c-secure property. Let
α be a primitive element of a finite field GF(q) where q is
a prime power.




1 1 1 · · · 1
α α2 α3 · · · αN
α2 (α2)2 (α3)2 · · · (αN )2






αc−1 (α2)c−1 (α3)c−1 · · · (αN )c−1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
It is well known that αi = αj if i = j (this is a prop-
erty of primitive elements). Since G is a Vandermonde
matrix, it can be shown that any c+1 columns ofG are lin-
early independent when α,α2,α3, . . . ,αN are all distinct.
In practice,G can be generated by the primitive element α
ofGF(q). Therefore, thewth column ofG is stored at node
Uw; it is only required to store the seed αw, and any node
can regenerate the column given the seed.
2.4 Threat model
Wireless sensor nodes are deployed in unattended envi-
ronment often in an area under the control of adversaries.
Thus, the sensor nodes that gather and communicate sen-
sitive information are vulnerable to attacks. An active
adversary can physically capture a number of nodes, and it
can get to know the stored keys into them. These keys can
thereafter be used by the adversary to decrypt messages
communicated across sensor nodes. We shall discuss two
types of attacks to our proposed scheme.
2.4.1 Random node capture
In this type of attack, the adversary randomly captures
nodes from the deployment zone and exposes the keys
loaded into them.
2.4.2 Selective node capture
This attack was first introduced in [37]. An active attacker
is in attempt to obtain a set T of keys. For achieving this,
the attacker is compromising sensor nodes. It has already
obtained a set of keys S this way, where S ⊂ T . For each
node s in the WSN, the random variable G(s) is equal
to the number of keys belonging to T \ S; the attacker
gains by compromising s nodes. At each step of the attack
sequence, the next sensor to be tampered with is sensor
s, where s maximizes E[G(s)|I(s)], the expectation of the
key information gain G(s) given the information I(s) that
the attacker knows on sensor s’s key ring.
3 Proposed scheme
3.1 Key predistribution in the group
Here, our aim is to design a key predistribution scheme for
a sensor network consistingN nodes whereN ≤ p2+p+1
where p is a prime number.
We use the scheme in [6,7] by Çamtepe and Yener and
Blom’s scheme [4]. This scheme is based on symmetric
design (Section 2) . They used a symmetric (p2 + p +
1, p+1, 1) design to build a key predistribution scheme for
WSN.
We shall be using a (p2 + p + 1, p + 1, 1) -symmetric
balanced incomplete block design (X,A). Here, X =
{x1, x2, . . . , xv}, v = p2 + p + 1. A = {B : B =
{xj1 , xj2 , . . . , xjp+1}, j1, j2, . . . , jp+1 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , v}, jm =
jn, 1 ≤ m, n ≤ p + 1}. |A| = p2 + p + 1. Here, Bis are
the individual blocks for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p2 + p + 1}.
|Bi| = p + 1,∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p2 + p + 1}.
3.1.1 The scheme
Definition 1. For any node ni ∈ N , and a variety xl ∈ X
and a block Bd ∈ A, POS(Bd, xl) is an integer taking values
from the set {1, 2, . . . , k}, where f (ni) = Bd and xl ∈ Bd.
The node ni stores the values of POS(Bd, xl),∀xl ∈ Bd.
Since, |Bd| = k,∀Bd ∈ A, so each node stores k number
of POS(∗, ∗) values.
Definition 2. f is a one-to-one map from the set of nodes
of the sensor network to the blocks of the symmetric (p2 +
p + 1, p + 1, 1) design. In addition to that, we assume that
f −1 can be computed in constant time.
It can be noted that the nodes can be identified by the
identifier of the blocks they correspond to. Therefore, one
example of the function f is the identity mapping ifN ⊆ A.
The total number of nodes in deployment be t = |N |.
Choose a prime power p such that t ≤ p2 + p + 1.
Now, design a symmetric (p2 + p + 1, p + 1, 1) BIBD
using Algorithm 1 of [7]. Comparing a (v, b, r, k, λ)-design
to this symmetric (p2 + p + 1, p + 1, 1)-design, we get
v = b = p2 + p + 1, k = r = p + 1 and λ = 1. The
varieties of the design are denoted by x1, x2, . . . , xp2+p+1
and the blocks as B1,B2, . . . ,Bp2+p+1. We shall design our
key predistribution scheme in nodes using this symmetric
(p2 + p + 1, p + 1, 1)-design. Let the security parameter
be c as in Section 2.3. We shall later discuss on a feasible
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value the integer c. Now, compute p2 + p + 1 symmet-
ric c × c matrices D1,D2, . . . ,Dp2+p+1 over a finite field
GF(q). Now, construct a c × r matrix G using the method





1 1 1 · · · 1
α α2 α3 · · · αr
α2 (α2)2 (α3)2 · · · (αr)2






αc−1 (α2)c−1 (α3)c−1 · · · (αr)c−1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
Algorithm 2 maps a (v, b, r, k, λ) design (X,A) of
Section 2.1 into a key predistribution scheme. Let N =
{n1, n2, . . . , nt} be the set of nodes in the WSN. We
can design a key predistribution in these nodes using
Algorithm 2 and taking v = b = p2 + p + 1, r = p + 1.
In Algorithm 2, we take v = p2 + p + 1 many different
key spaces of the Blom scheme [4]. We compute one c× r
public matrix G and a set of v many c × c secret symmet-
ric matrix Di, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , v}. Thus, we can compute v
many Amatrices like this : Ai = (DiG˙)T . Hence, there are
v many distinct key spaces of Blom scheme. Now, we can
have a key distribution scheme by considering each of the
v key space as a variety of the (p2+p+1, p+1, 1)- SBIBD,
where each block of the SBIBD corresponds to a node of
the WSN. Since a block of a (p2 + p + 1, p + 1, 1)- SBIBD
contains p+ 1 many varieties, every node will have its key
share from exactly p + 1 many key spaces.
Algorithm 2 Algorithm for key predistribution in nodes.
Require: A combinatorial design (X,A) where
X = {x1, x2, . . . , xv},
A = {B1,B2, . . . ,Bb},
N = {n1, n2, . . . , nt},
f : N → A is a one-one map,
A c × r Matrix G,
v number of c × cMatrices D1,D2, . . . ,Dv.
Ensure: A key predistribution in sensor nodes ofN .
for all xj ∈ X, 1 ≤ j ≤ v do
Find ordered set S = {Bj1 ,Bj2 , . . . ,Bjr } be such that
Bjk ∈ A, xj ∈ Bjk ;∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r} ; Bjk = Bjl , 1 ≤
k, l ≤ r and ∀B ∈ A \ S, xj /∈ B.
Compute Aj = (Dj.G)T
for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r} do
if f −1(Bji) exists then
Store the ith row of matrix Aj in node f −1(Bji)
Store the 2nd row of G in node f −1(Bji)





It is easy to see that one node nh contains one row from
each matrix of the set Mh where Mh ⊂ {A1,A2, . . . ,Av}
where |Mh| = k. The dimension of each row is c. Also, the
node contains row 2 of matrix G which is (α,α2, . . . ,αr).
It can be seen that for (p2 + p + 1, p + 1, 1) SBIBD r = k.
Again, a node ni stores POS(f (ni), xi) for i ∈ V,V ⊂
{1, 2, . . . , v}, |V| = k. So, the overhead on each node is
O(kc + r + k). For most of the cases, c is a small constant.
In this design k = p+ 1. Therefore, the memory overhead
is O(p) or O(
√|N |).
3.1.3 Shared key discovery between two nodes
Two nodes wishing to communicate securely need to
agree upon a secret key. In the scheme discussed in
Section 3.1.1, any two nodes can surely compute a shared
key. We provide an algorithm that takes all arguments of
Algorithm 2 and finds a shared key between two nodes. In
addition, the algorithm takes two nodes as input and finds
a common key shared by both of them.
The most costly computation of Algorithm 3 is at step
3. This step reduces in finding all the blocks of a design
that contains a particular variety. This can be found using
a different construction of symmetric BIBD as discussed
in Section 8.4 of [32].
Algorithm 3 Algorithm to compute common key
between node ni an nj.
Require: Combinatorial design (X,A) used in
Algorithm 2 where
X = {x1, x2, . . . , xv},
A = {B1,B2, . . . ,Bb},
N = {n1, n2, . . . , nt},
f : N → A is a one-one map,
A c × r Matrix G,
v number of c × cMatrices D1,D2, . . . ,Dv.
Ensure: Compute the common key between node ni
and nj
1) Let, By = f (ni),Bz = f (nj)
2) Compute xm ∈ X,m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , v} such that xm ∈
By ∩ Bz
3) Findu = POS(By, xm) and w = POS(Bz, xm)
4) Compute wth column of matrix G from
(α,α2, . . . ,αr).
5) Kni,nj = (uth row of matrix Am).(wth column of
matrix G)
Time complexity of Algorithm 3 The first step reduces
in inverting the node ids. We assumed that f is invert-
ible in constant time. So, the first step can be done in
time O(1). The second step computes a common variety
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belonging to two different blocks in the design used in
Algorithm 2. Note that in a (p2 + p + 1, p + 1, 1)-SBIBD,
any two blocks will share a unique common variety. Com-
puting such a variety in a (p2 + p + 1, p + 1, 1)-SBIBD
is equivalent to computing a basis of the intersection of
two-dimensional subspaces. This can be done in con-
stant time using the Algorithm 1. The third step is a
lookup of memory and is, too, of time complexity O(1)
if the items are stored in an indexed table. In the fourth
step, the wth column of matrix G is calculated which
is given by (1,αw, (αw)2, (αw)3, . . . , (αw)c−1)′. Since the
nodes store αi for each i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , r and c is a constant,
so computing the wth column of matrix G requires O(1)
computation. Finally, the fifth step can also be done in
constant time since the vectors are of constant dimension.
Therefore, the overall runtime of Algorithm 3 is O(1).
Note that node ni stores the value u = POS(By, xm)
in the Algorithm 3, and node nj stores the value of w =
POS(Bz, xm). However, for computing the shared key, both
the nodes need the values of u and w. So, the two nodes
must exchange the values of u and w which will incur
an additional communication cost of O(1). To avoid this,
every node can store the values of POS(∗, ∗) for other
nodes. For example node ni = f −1(By) needs to store the
values of POS(Be, xl) : 1 ≤ e ≤ v, e = y, xl = Be⋂By.
This will require a memory overhead of O(N ).
3.2 Proof of correctness of algorithms
Here, we establish the correctness of Algorithm 2 and
Algorithm 3. It will be sufficient to show that after deploy-
ment, a pair of distinct nodes ni and nj, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ v
will be able to compute their common key Kninj = Knjni
using the shared key discovery method of Algorithm 3.
According to Algorithm 3, both node ni and node nj will
compute the blocks By = f (ni) and Bz = f (nj). Now,
they can find the common element xm ∈ By⋂Bz : 1 ≤
m ≤ v using Algorithm 1. Now, node ni will compute
u = POS(By, xm). Similarly, node nj will calculate w =
POS(Bz, xm). Node ni and nj will exchange the values u
and v. Node ni will compute the wth column of matrix G
from (α,α2, . . . ,αr) stored in it. Similarly, node nj will cal-
culate the uth column of matrix G from (α,α2,αr) stored
in it. From Algorithm 1, we can see that node ni and nj
have got the uth and wth row of matrix Am = (Dm.G)T .
Hence, node ni can compute Kuw = (uth row of matrix
Am).(wth column of matrix G. Node nj will compute
Kwu = (wth row of matrix Am).(uth column of matrix
G in a similar way. Since Am.G is a symmetric matrix,
Kuw = Kwu = Kninj . Hence, the two nodes will end up
computing the same key using Algorithm 3. Therefore, the
Algorithm 2 and 3 are correct. It can be noted that any row
of matrix Ak , 1 ≤ k ≤ v is contained only in exactly one
node according to Algorithm 2. So, only node ni contains
the uth row of Am and only node nj contains the wth row
of Am. Hence, no other node can compute the common
key Kninj .
4 Performance analysis of proposed scheme
In this section, we shall investigate the security aspects
of the proposed scheme. As discussed in Section 1, sen-
sor nodes are deployed in unattended environment often
in area controlled by an adversary. So, an active adversary
can compromise one or more sensor nodes of the deploy-
ment zone. If the sensor nodes are not tamper proof, the
adversary can extract sensitive information from the set of
sensor nodes compromised by the adversary and can use
those informations to overhear the conversation between
active sensor nodes.
Lemma 3. For the proposed scheme, let S be the set of
compromised sensor nodes. Let, f (S) = {f (n) : n ∈ S}. Two
uncompromised nodes n1 and n2 will have an uncompro-
mised link between them if and only if |{B : B ∈ f (S)&x ∈
B}| ≤ c−1, where x = B1∩B2 and f (n1) = B1, f (n2) = B2.
Proof. Follows from the fact that c is the security param-
eter of the scheme in Section 2.3.
Let, x = xκ , where κ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , v}. Then by
Algorithm 2 and 2.3, it can be said that if thematrixAκ can
be compromised, then the common key between node n1
and n2 can be computed. This can only be possible if and
only if any c number of rows of the matrix Aκ are compro-
mised. Let ψ = {n : n ∈ N&xκ ∈ f (n)}. Hence, the nodes
in ψ contain one distinct row of Aκ each. So, successful
computation of the shared key is possible if and only if
|S ∩ ψ | ≥ c. In other words, the common key between
the two nodes n1 and n2 will remain active if and only if
|{B : B ∈ f (S)&x ∈ B}| ≤ c − 1.
Proposition 4. Let the total number of nodes be N and
the security parameter be c. If s number of nodes are
compromised and s ≥ c, the probability that two uncom-










Proof. Let C denote the event that the two nodes will
share an uncompromised link. Let the two nodes be given
by n1 and n2. Let, f (n1) = B1 and f (n2) = B2, where
B1,B2 ∈ A. There must be a unique xi ∈ X such that
{xi} = B1 ∩ B2. Again, let the set of compromised nodes
be S, where |S| = s. The adversary cannot compute the
shared key between n1 and n2 iff |{B : B ∈ f (S)&xi ∈ B}| ≤
c − 1. In a symmetric (v, k, λ) design, there are k number
of blocks containing a particular variety. So, for any par-
ticular variety xi ∈ X, |{B : B ∈ A&xi ∈ B}| = k. Again,
B1,B2 ∈ {B : B ∈ A&xi ∈ B}. Therefore, |{B : B ∈ A&xi ∈
B,B = B1,B = B2}| = k − 2.
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We provide the values of P(C) for different sets of
parameters in Table 2. It can be seen that our scheme has
high probability of existence of a live link between two
uncaptured nodes even when large number of nodes are
compromised. Here, p is the prime number of the sym-
metric balanced incomplete block design that is used in
the scheme. c is the security parameter of Blom’s scheme.
s is the number of compromised nodes. Table 2 shows that
this scheme has a high probability of existence of a key link
between two nodes even when many nodes are compro-
mised. Also, if p increases, the number of nodes increases
and so does the probability of existence of a link between
a pair of nodes.
4.1 Performance analysis in terms of knownmeasures
We shall analyze the performance of our scheme in terms
of two well-known measures viz. E(s) and V (s). These are
the standard measures used for evaluating the resiliency
of any key predistribution scheme.
Definition 5. E(s) is defined to be the ratio of the num-
ber of links exposed in the network when s number of nodes
are compromised to the number of links present in the
network before s number of nodes were compromised.
Let, L be the total number of links in a network and l be
the number of links exposed after s number of nodes are
compromised.
then E(s) = lL
Here, we will consider only the resiliency of the subnet-
work consisting of nodes. E(s) is the measure that shows
Table 2 Probability of existence of an active link between
two uncompromised nodes in our scheme for different
parameters
p c s Probability of existence of link
37 4 34 0.998651
37 4 77 0.869753
47 4 77 0.930515
61 4 89 0.948484
67 5 89 0.991089
67 4 128 0.886519
61 5 110 0.970800
71 5 223 0.810936
Here, p is the prime number, s is the number of compromised nodes, and c is the
security parameter of the scheme.
the performance of the scheme in terms of it’s resiliency
against node captures. As defined above, E(s) is the mea-
sure that shows the fraction of links that gets exposed
when s number of nodes get compromised. So, the lesser
the value of E(s) is, the more resilient is the scheme to
node capture attack.
Let S be the set of s sensor nodes. S ⊆ N . For two sensor




0 if the adversary can compute the
common key between node ni and
nj using the information stored in






0 if |{B : B ∈ f (S)&x ∈ B}| ≥ c,
where x = B1 ∩ B2 and f (n1) = B1
f (n2) = B2
1 if |{B : B ∈ f (S)&x ∈ B}| ≤ c − 1,
where x = B1 ∩ B2 and f (n1) = B1









Hence, E(s) = EXP(ϕ(S)), where EXP() is the expecta-
tion operator.
Theorem 6. For our scheme with p2+p+1many nodes,
E(s) ≤ cp2+p+1 for s ≤ c(c+1)2
Proof. The total number of nodes is p2 + p + 1. That





We take the attacker’s point of view who would try to
expose more links through compromising as less num-
ber of nodes as possible. In our design, a link can be
exposed only if at least c number of nodes are compro-
mised that contain one row of matrix Ah, each for some
h ∈ {1, 2, . . . , v}. If c number of rows are compromised,
then the attacker would be able to reconstruct the matrix
Ah. Since A is a (p + 1) × c, the attacker would be able to









links would get exposed. Let,
n0, n1, . . . , np be p + 1 nodes such that xi = ∩pj=0f (nj)
for any xi ∈ X, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , v}. If any c of the nodes
n0, n1, . . . , np is compromised by the adversary, then we
would be able to reconstruct matrix Ai and hence, the
links between nodes n0, n1, . . . , np will get exposed. So,





set of nodes compromised by the advisor for obtaining Ai
be S. Hence, |S| ≥ c. Since, the attacker’s intention is to
compromise as less number of nodes as possible, we can





links by compromising more nodes.
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The attacker can do this through compromising another
matrix Aj, j = h, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , v}. This time, the attacker
needs to compromise c−1 nodes. First, an attacker selects
a j = h such that a node in S does contain a row Aj.
Choosing such a j will ensure that the attacker will have
to compromise c − 1 more nodes. It can be proved that
for any j = h, there is at most one node in S that con-
tains a row of matrix Aj. So, the attacker would require
to compromise c − 1 additional nodes for exposing (p+12
)
links. This way, it can be proved that the attacker would





number of links and so on. This way, the




number of links by cap-
turing c + (c − 1) + (c − 2) + . . . + 1 nodes or c(c+1)2
nodes.











Theorem 6 gives an upper bound of the extent of dam-
age that occurs to the subnetwork consisting of nodes.
Since p2 + p + 1 >> c, so E(s) is very close to zero or, in
other words, the number of links that get exposed is small
when less than c(c+1)2 number of nodes are captured.
Lemma 7. If a set of S sensor nodes get captured, then
a node ni /∈ S will get disconnected from the rest of the
network if and only if ∀x ∈ f (ni), |{B : B ∈ f (S), x ∈ B}| ≥
c.
Proof. The proof follows from Lemma 3 and the c secu-
rity property.
Definition 8. V (s) is the fraction of nodes that get dis-
connected from the rest of the networks. Let m be the
number of uncompromised nodes that get disconnected
from the rest of the network of size N when s nodes are
compromised, then V (s) = mN−s−m.
Theorem 9. V (s) = 0,∀s < (p + 1)c.
Proof. Let the attacker wants to disconnect a particu-
lar node ni, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , v} from the rest of the network.
Let, S be the minimal set of nodes that the attacker needs
to capture for disconnecting the first (uncompromised)
node from the rest of the network. Let Bj = f (ni), j ∈
{1, 2, . . . , v}. Hence, Bj ∈ X. Let, {x1, x2, . . . , xp+1} = Bj.
Let ∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p + 1},Ck = {B : B ∈ f (S)&xk ∈ B}. It
can be seen that f (S) = ∪p+1k=1Ck .
We claim that Ck ∩ C′k = φ, k = k′, 1 ≤ k, k′ ≤ p + 1.
If not, then suppose there exists a block Bm ∈ Ck ∩ C′k .
Hence, xk , x′k ∈ Bm. So, |Bm ∩ Bj| ≥ 2. This is not possible
since the design we used is a symmetric (p2+p+1, p+1, 1)
design. So our assumption is wrong.
From the c-security property, we can say that |Ck| =
c∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p + 1}. Hence, |f (S)| = |S| = (p + 1)c.
Hence the result.
The performance of our scheme in terms ofV (s) for cer-
tain value of parameters is shown in Figure 1. It can be
seen that the value of V (s) in Figure 1 is in agreement with
the result stated in Theorem 9.
4.2 Comparative study of the scheme
Here, we compare the resiliency of our proposed scheme
with other existing schemes. Some well-known standard
schemes are the basic scheme of Eschenauer and Gligor
[1], Lee and Stinson’s quadratic and linear scheme based
on transversal design in [8,9,38], Çamptepe and Yener’s
Figure 1 Graphical representation of the value of V(s)with respect to the number of nodes compromised for our scheme. The parameters
for this graph is p=29,c=4, and number of nodes=871.
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scheme in [7], the scheme of Chakrabarti et al. [11], and
partially balanced incomplete block design based scheme
by Ruj and Roy in [10].
The scheme of Eschenauer and Gligor in [1] is a prob-
abilistic key predistribution scheme. This scheme uses a
pool of keys. Keys are drawn randomly from the key pool
with replacement and are placed in the sensor nodes. All
nodes are loaded with same number of keys. This scheme
does not ensure the existence of a common key between a
pair of nodes. This scheme is known as the basic scheme.
Lee and Stinson [8,38] used transversal design in key
predistribution. They proposed two types of transversal
design viz. linear and quadratic. In these schemes, a pair
of nodes can have zero or one key in common. They used
the following construction of a transversal design TD(k, r)
[8].
1. X = {(x, y) : 0 ≤ x < k, 0 ≤ y < r}.
2. ∀i,Gi = {(i, y) : 0 ≤ y < r}.
3. A = {Ai,j : 0 ≤ i < r&0 ≤ j < r}.
They defined block Ai,j by Ai,j = (x, xi+ j mod r) : 0 ≤
x < k, 0 ≤ i, j < r. Similarly for a quadratic scheme, they
defined a block Ai,j,k by Ai,j,k =
(
x, xi2 + xj+k mod r) :
0≤x<k, 0≤ i, j<r.
Each block is assigned to a node. So, the linear Lee-
Stinson’s scheme supports r2 nodes, and the quadratic
scheme supports as many as p3 nodes.
Çamtepe and Yener used symmetric balanced incom-
plete block design in [7]. A SBIBD is a (p2+p+1, p+1, 1)
design where p is a prime number. They used projec-
tive geometry for constructing the SBIBD. This scheme
ensures full connectivity between nodes. Each node in this
scheme contains p+ 1 keys, and every key is contained in
p + 1 nodes.
Chakrabarti et al. [11] proposed a hybrid key predis-
tribution scheme by merging the blocks in combinatorial
designs. They considered the blocks constructed from
the transversal design proposed by Lee and Stinson and
randomly selected them and merged them to form the
sensor nodes. Though this scheme increases the number
of the keys per node, it improves the resiliency of the net-
work. The probability that two nodes share a common key
is also high. Thus, it has a better connectivity.
Ruj and Roy proposed two schemes for key predistri-
bution in [10]. They used partially balanced incomplete
block design. In the first scheme, the number of nodes as
well as the number of keys are equal to n(n−1)/2 for some
positive integer n. The number of keys in a node is equal
to 2(n−2). The number of nodes containing the same key
is also 2(n − 2). They presented another design that aug-
ments the size of the network, keeping the same number
of keys in each node. The keys in the key pool also remain
the same. They showed that network size can be increased
in steps, keeping the same number of keys per node. How-
ever, to ensure that any pair of nodes can communicate
directly, we cannot go on adding nodes in this scheme.
We have defined E(s) in Section 4.1. E(s) is the best
measure of resiliency of any key predistribution scheme.
A key predistribution scheme for which the value of E(s)
is lower offers better resiliency against node capture. So,
a key predistribution scheme having low value of E(s)
for different values of captured nodes can withstand key
compromise. Figure 2 shows a comparison between our
scheme with these schemes in terms of E(s). Wemeasured
the resiliency of the key predistribution schemes bymeans
Figure 2 Graphical comparison of fraction of links exposed.With respect to the number of nodes compromised for our scheme and other
schemes. The parameters for this comparison can be found in Table 3. The line corresponding to the performance of our scheme almost touches
the horizontal axis and hence can hardly be seen.
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of simulation. The parameters of different key predistri-
bution schemes and the number of nodes in the WSN
are given in Table 3. We have chosen nearly equal sizes
of networks for different schemes in consideration. The
other parameters are chosen depending upon the network
size and the system models so that the key predistribu-
tion schemes exhibit optimal performance. N is the total
number of nodes in the network, and k is the number of
keys per node. The value of k depends upon the other
parameters of the network which in turn depend upon the
network size. The last column of Table 3 shows whether
the key predistribution scheme ensures full connectivity
among the nodes or not. We used C program to evalu-
ate the values of E(s) for different values of s for all the
schemes mentioned above. We compiled the source using
GNUC compiler GCC 4.5.4. We considered random node
capture by the adversary. In Figure 2, the line correspond-
ing to the performance of our scheme almost touches the
x-axis throughout the range. Hence, it can be inferred that
less number of links get exposed in our scheme as com-
pared to other schemes when same number of nodes are
captured by the adversary. In other words, our scheme
offers better performance than all the other schemes in
terms of E(s). The reason why our scheme excels in per-
formance can be inferred from Lemma 3. Lemma 3 says
that in order to compromise the links between any two
nodes, the adversary is required to compromise at least
c (c is the security parameter) nodes having information
from the same key space as the two nodes. However, in
other schemes, the same thing can be done by capturing
a single node. So, even if the number of captured nodes
is high enough, the value of E(s) can be very low in our
scheme. This fact is corroborated by the performance of
our scheme as shown in Figure 2.
5 New grid-group deployment-based design
We shall use our proposed key predistribution scheme
in developing a key predistribution scheme for grid-
Table 3 Schemes with parameters that we choose for our
comparisons and connectivity
Scheme N k Full connectivity
Basic [1] 2,415 136 No
Camtepe-Yener [6] 2,257 48 Yes
Linear [38] 2,209 30 No
Quadratic [38] 2,197 12 No
CMR [11] 2,550 28 No
PBIBD I [10] 2,415 136 Yes
PBIBD II [10] 2,450 96 Yes
Current scheme 2,257 48 Yes
N is the total number of nodes in the network, and k is the number of keys in a
node.
group deployment. As mentioned earlier in Section 1, a
grid-group deployment refers to such deployment where
the entire network is broken into smaller regions called
groups. The sensor nodes belonging to one group could
be deemed as a mini-WSN where the sensors of a certain
group communicates among themselves more frequently
than with sensors of different groups. We propose a key
predistribution scheme for a WSN where the network is
divided into aN×N square grid. Each group in this group
has got identical number of sensors.
5.1 The scheme
Let p be a prime number. LetN ≤ p2+p+1 be the number
of sensors in each group. The groups are denoted by the
two tuple (i, j), 0 ≤ i, j ≤ N . We shall denote the nodes of
any group (i, j) as nlij, 0 ≤ l ≤ t−1.We designate one node
from each group as a supernode. This supernode has got
more amount of resources than ordinary nodes in terms
of memory, computational power, battery power, etc. This
special node will be used for intergroup communication.
The supernode of group (i, j) is denoted by Si,j. It can be
noted that a supernode Si,j of any group (i, j) does belong
to the set {nlij : 0 ≤ l ≤ t − 1}. If a node nαi,j of group (i, j)
wants to communicate with node nβi′,j′ of group (i′, j′), then
the following steps are taken:
• Node nαi,j generates a random key K.• Node nαi,j send K to the supernode Sij.• Sij passes K to Si′j′ .
• Si′j′ sends K to node nβi′,j′ .
Now, the two nodes viz nαi,j and n
β
i′,j′ can communicate
using the key K.
It can be noted that for accomplishing all the steps
mentioned above, it is necessary to have:
1. Any two pair of nodes nαi,j and nα
′
i,j belonging to group
(i, j) must be able to communicate securely
∀α ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , t − 1} and 0 ≤ i, j ≤ p − 1.
2. Any pair of supernodes Si,j and Si′,j′ belonging to two
different groups (i, j) and (i′, j′) must be able to
communicate securely where
0 ≤ i, j, i′, j′ ≤ p − 1, (i, j) = (i′, j′).
We now state our key predistribution scheme in detail.
From the above discussion, it is clear that we need to have
two types of key predistribution. One type of key pre-
distribution is for the nodes within each of the groups
and the other for the supernodes belonging to distinct
groups. For each of the N2 groups, we use our key pre-
distribution scheme discussed in Section 3 for key pre-
distribution. However, we do use distinct key spaces for
key predistribution in each of the groups. Hence, if all the
nodes corresponding to one region get captured in the
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hands of the adversary, the keys in sensor nodes in other
groups remain unaffected. It should be kept in mind that
a supernode belongs to the group corresponding to the
square region they are deployed in. Hence, a supernode
contains two types of keys, one that allows it to commu-
nicate securely with other nodes in the same group they
belong to and the other that allows it to communicate with
other supernodes belonging to different groups. There-
fore, the key predistribution in the whole network looks
like the following :
1. Key predistribution for each of the N2 groups is done
by using the scheme of Section 3 using exclusive key
spaces for all the groups.
2. A separate key predistribution using the same
scheme of Section 3 is done for all the supernodes
belonging to all the groups.
We assume that it is hard to capture a supernode until
the entire square region where the supernode is located is
compromised.We have assumed that the nodes within the
same square region communicate more frequently than
the two nodes each belonging to a separate square region.
Hence, one supernode per group is sufficient to handle the
burden of intergroup communication.
5.2 Resiliency of the network
When it comes to the resiliency of the key predistribution
scheme in a grid-group deployment of the sensor network,
there are three types of resiliency:
• Intragroup resiliency : resiliency within a certain
group.
• Resiliency of the interlinks : resiliency in the set of
supernodes.
• Overall resiliency : resiliency of the entire network.
Within a group, the nodes work as a singleWSN. Hence,
the resiliency of the key predistribution is same as in
Section 4. In this section, we study the resiliency of the
interlinks in our key predistribution scheme. Here, too,
similar to Section 4, we shall be using the standard mea-
sures for evaluating the resiliency of our scheme. The two
measures we shall be using are E′(s) and V ′(s).
Definition 10. E′(s) is defined to be the fraction of inter-
links between groups that get exposed when s number of
supernodes are captured by the adversary. In other words,
E′(s) is the ratio of the interlinks present in the grid after
s many supernodes are captured to the number of inter-
links present in the network before s many supernodes
are captured.




1 if the common keybetween Si,jandSh,k
exists
0 elsewhere






It can be seen that in our design, all the supernodes have
a common key between each other. Hence,
T(i, j) = N2 − 1 ∀(i, j) ∈ S.




1 if the adversary can compute the
common key between supernode
Si,jandSh,kusing the information














where EXP is the expectation over all S ⊆ S of size |S| = s.
We compare the experimental values of E′(s) of our
scheme with the experimental values of the key predis-
tribution scheme for grid-group deployment by Ruj and
Roy in [18]. Ruj and Roy considered similar deployment
of sensor nodes as we did except that they used three
supernodes per region whereas we used a single one. The
supernodes are meant to provide interregion connectivity
similar to our scheme. Both the schemes offer full connec-
tivity between regions through supernodes. Ruj and Roy
used transversal designs for key predistribution in supern-
odes. Figure 3 shows the comparison of the performance
of our scheme with the scheme by Ruj and Roy in terms
of E′(s). The parameters of this graph can be found in
Table 4.We considered a 37×37 square grid as the deploy-
ment zone in both the cases. In our scheme every square
region contains one supernode and in Ruj and Roy scheme
the number of supernodes per region is 3. Hence, the total
number of supernodes is 1369 in our scheme and 4107 in
Ruj-Roy scheme. The value of the security parameter of
our key predistribution scheme is taken to be 4.We used C
program to evaluate the values of E′(s) for different values
of s for both schemes.We compiled the source using GNU
C compiler GCC 4.5.4. Figure 3 shows that our scheme is
better than the scheme in [18] in terms of the number of
interlinks broken when same number of supernodes are
compromised in the hand of the adversary. So, for our
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Our Scheme
Scheme of Ruj Roy
Figure 3 Graphical comparison of fraction of interlinks disconnected. This comparison is done with respect to the number of supernodes
compromised for our scheme and the scheme in [18].
scheme, less number of links will get broken than the Ruj-
Roy schemewhen the same number of nodes are captured.
So, in our scheme, more interregion links remain intact
than the Ruj-Roy scheme when some supernodes are cap-
tured. Thus, our scheme exhibits better performance than
the Ruj-Roy scheme though it makes use of only one-third
of the number of supernodes used in Ruj-Roy scheme.
Our scheme reduces the cost incurred due to the deploy-
ment of large number of supernodes and also enhances
the resiliency of the network against node capture.
Definition 11. V ′(s) is the fraction of groups that are
disconnected from the rest of the groups with respect to the
total number of groups when s number of supernodes are
captured. In other words V ′(s) is the ratio of the number of
groups that do not have any link to other groups after the
s number of supernodes are captured to the total number
of active supernodes present in the network before s many
supernodes are captured.
The result proved in Theorem 9 is also applicable for the
interlinks between supernodes in different groups. Hence,
for our scheme, individual groups do not get disconnected
from the rest of the network unless a large number of
supernodes get captured.
Table 4 Parameters used in comparison of the proposed
scheme and the Ruj and Roy scheme in Figure 3
Parameters Ruj-Roy scheme Scheme of the
current study
Number of square regions 1,369 1,369
Security parameter - 4
Number of keys per node 13 -
Total number of nodes 4,107 1,369
Figure 4 shows the comparative performance of our
scheme, and the Ruj-Roy scheme where the comparison
is done in terms of V ′(s). The parameters of the graphi-
cal plot of Figure 4 is shown in Table 5. As defined above,
V ′(s) is the fraction of nodes that get entirely discon-
nected from the rest of the network when s number of
nodes get exposed. We used a 37× 37 square grid in each
case. The total number of supernodes in the entire net-
work is 4, 107 in Ruj-Roy scheme and 1, 369 in our scheme.
We have taken the security parameter of our scheme to be
4. The value of p in our scheme is 37. The number of keys
(k) in a supernode is 23 in Ruj-Roy scheme. We used C
program to evaluate the values of E′(s) for different values
of s for both schemes.We compiled the source using GNU
C compiler GCC 4.5.4. Figure 4 shows that in our scheme,
less number of nodes get detached from the network than
the Ruj-Roy scheme in [18] when same number of nodes
get captured by the adversary. Hence, our scheme is bet-
ter than the Ruj-Roy scheme as it can keep more nodes
connected to the network.
5.3 Overall resiliency
We shall now study the resiliency of the entire network
taking into account all the groups, nodes, and supernodes.
We define E′′(s) as a newmeasure of overall resiliency in
the entire network. It is defined to be the weighted average
of the fractions of links exposed in every region (i, j), 0 ≤
i, j ≤ N − 1 as well as the fraction of links exposed among
the pair of supernodes when some nodes are compro-
mised by the adversary in the entire network. The weight
corresponding to the fraction of exposed links in a region
(i, j) is equal to the number of pairs of uncompromised
nodes present in that region (i, j). The weight correspond-
ing to the fraction of exposed links between the supern-
odes are equal to the number of pairs of uncompromised

























Number of nodes compromised
Our Scheme
Scheme of Ruj Roy
Figure 4 Graphical comparison of fraction of nodes disconnected. This comparison is done with respect to the number of nodes compromised
for our scheme and the scheme in [18].
supernodes remaining in the network. We are the first to
propose this as a measure of overall resiliency in terms
of fraction of links exposed in the entire network. In this
measure, we separately compute the values of fraction of
links exposed(E(sij)) in every region (i, j) : 0 ≤ i, j ≤
N − 1. We also measure the value of E(s) among the
set of supernodes in the network. Then, we compute the
weighted average of all these values of E(s).
Here, we take into account the entire network consisting
of all the nodes and supernodes in all the regions. Let sij be
the number of nodes compromised in group (i, j) and s =∑N−1
i=0
∑N−1
j=0 sij. Also, let sg be the number of supernodes
compromised. Hence, 0 ≤ sg ≤ N2.
Let E(sij) be the value of fraction of links exposed in
group (i, j) when sij many nodes are captured in group
(i, j). Also, let Eg(sg) be the fraction of links exposed when
sg many supernodes are compromised. After sij many
nodes are compromised in region (i, j), the number of
uncompromised nodes present in region (i, j) is N − sij.
Hence, the weight corresponding to any region (i, j) is(N−sij
2
)
which is equal to the number of pairs of uncom-
promised nodes in region (i, j). Similarly, for the set of


























Table 5 Parameters used in comparison of the proposed
scheme and the Ruj and Roy scheme in Figure 4
Parameters Ruj-Roy scheme Scheme of the
current study
Number of square regions 1,369 1,369
Security parameter - 5
Number of keys per node 23 -
Total number of nodes 4,107 1,369
Hence, when the number of nodes captured from dif-
ferent groups is fixed, the overall E′′(s) is the weighted
average of the value of E(sij) of all groups and the group of
all supernodes.
Lemma 12. When sij number of nodes are compro-
mised in group (i, j), 0 ≤ i, j ≤ N − 1 then E′′(s) <
max0≤i,j<N (E(sij)) with a high probability where s =∑N−1
i=0
∑N−1
j=0 sij and s is not-so-large.





































Now, there are p2 + p + 1 many nodes in any group
which includes one supernode. If sij number of nodes are
captured in group (i, j), the probability that the supernode
will get captured is sijp2+p+1 . In order to expose at least one
link between two uncompromised supernodes, the adver-
sary will have to compromise at least c nodes containing
informations from the same key space of our scheme. The
probability of compromising c many supernodes contain-
ing information from the same key space is very close to

















with a high probability, and the result follows from this.
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Corollary 13. When sij number of nodes are compro-
mised in group (i, j), 0 ≤ i, j ≤ N − 1 then E′′(s) < cp2+p+1
with a high probability where s = ∑N−1i=0
∑N−1
j=0 sij and s is
not-so-large and for all (i, j) : 0 ≤ i, j < N , sij ≤ 12 c(c + 1).
Proof. Follows directly from Lemma 12 and Theorem 6.
Corollary 13 gives an upper bound of the numeric value
of fraction of links disconnected in the set of all uncom-
promised nodes of the network.
Definition 14. V ′′(s) is defined to be the weighted aver-
age of the fractions of nodes disconnected from the rest
of the network in a region (i, j) or in the set of supern-
odes when some nodes get compromised. Here, the weights
are proportional to the number of pairs of uncompromised
nodes present among the nodes in any region or among the
supernodes.We propose and apply this measure for the first
time for measuring the resiliency for such deployment of
wireless sensor network.
Let V (sij) be the value of the fraction of nodes discon-
nected in region (i, j) when sij many nodes are captured.
Again, let s = ∑N−1i=0
∑N−1
j=0 sij. Also let sg be the num-
ber of supernodes captured by the adversary and Vg(sg)
be the fraction of supernodes disconnected from other
supernodes when sg many supernodes are captured. After
sij many nodes are compromised in region (i, j), the num-
ber of uncompromised nodes present in region (i, j) is





which is equal to the number of pairs of
uncompromised nodes in region (i, j). Similarly, for the set

























Lemma 15. When sij number of nodes are compro-
mised in group (i, j), 0 ≤ i, j ≤ N − 1 then V ′′(s) <
max0≤i,j<N (V (sij)) with a high probability where s =∑N−1
i=0
∑N−1
j=0 sij and s is not so large.
Proof. The proof is same as Lemma 12.
Corollary 16. When sij number of nodes are compro-
mised in group (i, j), 0 ≤ i, j ≤ N − 1 then V ′′(s) = 0
with a high probability where s = ∑N−1i=0
∑N−1
j=0 sij and s is
not-so-large and for all (i, j) : 0 ≤ i, j < N , sij ≤ (p + 1)c.
Proof. Follows immediately from Lemma 15 and
Theorem 9.
Corollary 16 provides a bound for the value of fraction
of uncompromised nodes that get totally disconnected
from the network.
We have done simulation of the performance of the key
predistribution scheme for grid-group deployment tak-
ing E′′(s) and V ′′(s) as the measure of the performance
in the entire network. In this simulation, we randomly
chose/compromised s many nodes from the entire net-
work and then computed the values of E′′(s) and V ′′(s) for
them. Hence, it is equally probable for every chosen node
to belong to a certain region. We measured the values of
E′′(s)/V ′′(s) for any value of s by repeating the process 100
times and taking averages of the calculated values of the
E′′(s)/V ′′(s) for this 100 iterations.
The value of E′′(s) for different values of s can be found
in Table 6.
The values of E′′(s) for different values of the system
parameters are obtained through simulation of the key
predistribution model using C program. The first col-
umn of Table 6 shows the dimension of the grid used as
deployment zone. The second column gives the number
of nodes contained in a single group. The third column
Table 6 Values of E′′(s) for different values of s, size of grid and number of nodes in each group
Size of grid Number of nodes Number of Security s Value of E′′(s)
in each group supernodes parameter
13 553 169 4 4,801 0.033041
14 307 196 4 3,001 0.010839
15 183 225 4 4,001 0.042171
18 183 324 4 5,001 0.025552
11 553 121 4 3,001 0.021120
15 381 225 3 3,126 0.034396
18 307 324 3 3,886 0.031764
16 381 256 3 5,626 0.105274
18 307 324 3 6,106 0.095601
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shows the number of supernodes in the entire network
which is equal to R × R, R being the dimension of the
square grid. The fourth column corresponds to the secu-
rity parameter c. The fifth column gives the number of
nodes compromised. The last column shows the values
of E′′(s). It can be seen in Table 6 that as the grid size
increases, the value of E′′(s) decreases while other param-
eters remain the same. So, the adversary needs to capture
more nodes to damage the communication model con-
siderably if the grid size is high enough. This happens as
when the grid size increases, the total number of nodes in
the network increases and the number of links between
nodes also increases. It can be noted in this table that if the
value of the security parameter is kept as low as 3 or 4, the
key predistribution model can offer sufficient resiliency
against node capture.
Table 7 gives the values of V ′′(s) for different values of
the number of captured nodes. It can be seen from Table 7
that the value of V ′′(s) is very low even if a high number
of nodes are captured. So, the key predistribution model
is highly resilient as far as the V ′′(s) is concerned. Also,
if the size of the grid is increased, the value of V ′′(s) gets
reduced.
5.4 Comparison with other schemes
Next, we compare our proposed scheme with some other
key predistribution schemes that use deployment knowl-
edge. These schemes include Du et al. 2004 [20] and 2006
[21], Liu and Ning 2003 [39] and 2005 [40], Yu and Guan
2005 [28] and 2008 [29], Zhou et al. 2006 [23], Huang et al.
[24], Huang and Medhi 2007 [25], Chan and Perrig 2005
[26], Simonova et al. 2006 [27].
Huang et al. [24,25] used rectangular deployment zone
which is divided into equal-sized regions of smaller size. In
this scheme, the sensors randomly choose the keys. Huang
et al. used multispace Blom scheme [4] for key predistri-
bution. In this scheme, all nodes are identical with respect
to the amount of resources they possess. This is where
this scheme is different from ours. In our scheme, there
are two different types of nodes viz. common nodes and
agents giving rise to a heterogeneous network. Moreover,
in Huang et al. scheme, the nodes in a region can commu-
nicate directly with each other with probability of >0.5;
whereas, in our scheme, they can do so with a probability
equal to 1 as our scheme ensures full interregion connec-
tivity. Hence, in this scheme, more amount of computa-
tion will be required for communication than our scheme.
The scheme of Huang et al. is perfectly secure against
selective and random node capture attack. Hence, cap-
ture of some number of nodes by an adversary will have
negligible effect to the links among the uncompromised
nodes. However, if we take all the links of compromised
and uncompromised nodes into account, then the fraction
of links compromised will be higher.
Zhou et al. [23] used two types of sensor nodes viz.
static and mobile. This scheme uses pairwise keys with
each sensor within the same region. Hence, it requires
high amount of memory to hold the pairwise keys if the
number of sensors within a region is high enough. If there
are n number of nodes within a region, then the number
of keys to be stored in a node is O(n2) under the Zhou
et al. scheme; whereas, it isO(√n) in Çamptepe and Yener
scheme which is used in our key predistribution scheme.
Hence, our scheme is much better than Zhou et al. in
terms of memory efficiency.
Liu and Ning [39,40] used deployment knowledge.
There, the whole deployment zone is split into smaller
square regions like our scheme. However, in their
schemes, only a single node is deployed in a square
region as opposed to our scheme where there are a
group of nodes deployed in a region. They used the
polynomial-based scheme of Blundo et al. [5]. The
deployment region is broken down into equal-sized
squares {Cic,ir }ic = 0, 1, . . . ,C − 1, ir = 0, 1, . . . ,R − 1 ,
Table 7 Values of V ′′(s) for different values of s, size of grid and number of nodes in each group
Size of grid Number of nodes Number of Security s Value of V ′′(s)
in each group supernodes parameter
14 553 196 3 24,000 0.114369
15 307 225 3 20,000 0.187892
14 183 196 3 18,009 0.841926
11 381 121 4 24,000 0.959935
15 307 225 4 21,002 0.027675
13 871 169 3 25,000 0.033112
7 553 49 3 6,000 0.112729
9 553 81 4 11,000 0.030479
14 307 196 4 14,000 0.000322
7 381 49 3 10,000 0.976503
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each of which is a cell with coordinates (ic, ir) denoting
row ir and column ic . Each of the cells is associ-
ated with a bivariate polynomial. For a R × C grid,
the setup server generates RC t-degree polynomials
{fic,ir (x, y)}ic = 0, 1, . . . ,C − 1, ir = 0, 1, . . . ,R − 1,
and assigns fic,ir (x, y) to cell Cic,ir . For each sensor,
the setup server determine its home cell and its four
neighboring cells which lie adjacent to the home cell
in the same row and column. The setup server dis-
tributes to the sensor the coordinates of the home
cell and the polynomial shares of the home cell and
its neighboring cell. For example, for a sensor Uu in
the cell with coordinate (r′, c′), the polynomial shares
fr′−1,c′(u, y), fr′,c′−1(u, y), fr′+1,c′(u, y), fr′,c′+1(u, y), fr,c(u, y)
are given. For direct key establishment, a node broadcasts
the coordinates of its home cell. From this coordinate, the
destination node finds out the common polynomial that
it shares with the broadcasting node if at all. Now, the
common key can be calculated using the same method as
[5].
In Simonova et al.’s [27] scheme, the number of special-
ized nodes depends upon the size of the network unlike
ours which is constant (=1). The resiliency as given in
the graph is much lower compared to our scheme. Also,
resiliency in terms of nodes or regions disconnected has
not been presented.
Du et al. [21] proposed another key predistribution
using deployment knowledge that uses multiple space
Blom scheme [4]. Under this scheme, sensors randomly
choose keys from a set of different instances of Blom
space. Unlike our scheme, this scheme does not guaranty
full connectivity.
As we have discussed earlier, the key predistribu-
tion scheme of Ruj and Roy in [18] uses deployment
knowledge. Similar to our scheme, this scheme uses
the Çamptepe and Yener scheme for key predistribu-
tion within the same region. This scheme exhibits lower
resiliency among the set of agents that provide interre-
gion connectivity as discussed in previous sections. In
other words, our scheme offers more resilient interregion
connectivity than Ruj and Roy scheme.
Figure 5 shows a pictorial comparison of our scheme
with standard schemes that use deployment knowledge.
This comparison is based on the values of fraction of total
links broken when some nodes get captured. This com-
parison takes into account all the links in the network
which includes the links in compromised nodes as well.
The parameters of the different schemes are following:
DDHV scheme has parameters k = 200,ω = 11, and
τ = 2. LN scheme has parameters k = 200,m = 60, and
L = 1; YG scheme has parameters k = 100; ZNR scheme
has parameters k = 100; HMMH scheme has parameters
k = 200,ω = 27, and τ = 3; SLW scheme has parameters
k = 16, p = 11, and m = 4; Ruj-Roy scheme has param-
eters k = 12. Our scheme has parameters p = 11 and
c = 4. The size of the network in DDHV, LN, YG, ZNR,
and HMMH is 10,000; for SLW, it is 12,100. It is 16,093
for Ruj-Roy scheme and in our scheme. We simulated the
behavior of the key predistribution schemes for random
node capture attack. All schemes are implemented iden-
tical network. It can be seen in Figure 5 that our scheme
offers better performance than similar schemes that make
use of deployment knowledge up to a certain limit of the
number of nodes captured by the adversary. We used C
program for running the simulation.
The reason why our scheme excels in performance can
be inferred from Lemma 3 and Proposition 4. Lemma 3
says that in order to compromise the links between
any two nodes, the adversary is required to compro-





























Figure 5 Graphical comparison of fraction of links disconnected. This comparison is done with respect to the number of nodes compromised
for our scheme and the schemes in [18,20,21,23-29,39,40].
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information from the same key space as the two nodes.
However, inmost of the other schemes, the same thing can
be done by capturing a single node. Again, Proposition 4
says that the probability of existence of a link between a
pair of nodes is high even if many nodes are compromised.
So, even if the number of captured nodes is high enough,
the value of fraction of broken links can be very low in our
scheme. This fact is corroborated by the performance of
our scheme as shown in Figure 5.
We present a comparative study of communication,
storage, and scalability of several schemes in Table 8. This
table gives a comparison with respect to communica-
tion, storage cost, etc. of our scheme and the schemes in
[18,21,23-29,39,40]. The first column of Table 8 shows the
name of the scheme. The second column corresponds to
the type of deployment used by the key predistribution
scheme. The third column shows the type of nodes in the
WSN. There are two types of sensor nodes viz. homo-
geneous and heterogeneous. All the nodes in a homoge-
neous network are identical in terms of the resources they
possess. However, in heterogeneous networks, there are
different types of nodes who mainly differ in the amount
of computational resource built inside them. The fourth
column shows the communication cost of each key predis-
tribution scheme. When two nodes wish to communicate,
they need to exchange some information before a secure
communication can start. This information may be their
unique identifiers or something else that is required to
compute the shared key between them. The storage col-
umn gives the amount of memory needed to store the
keys a node. Here, N is the number of sensors in the net-
work, and g is the number of groups. The last column says
whether the key predistribution scheme is scalable or not.
The communication cost of our scheme is O(logN), and
the storage overhead isO(N 14 ). Our scheme consumes less
amount of memory than other schemes except the DDHV
scheme in [20,21] and the Yu-Guan scheme in [28,29] that
uses constant amount of storage. However, our scheme
outperforms both of them in terms of resiliency measure
used in the comparison in Figure 5.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented a key predistribution
scheme for a wireless sensor for a grid-group-based
deployment. Here, the entire deployment zone is a square
which is divided into a number of smaller squares. Each
square is identical in terms of physical area and number
of sensor nodes. The sensor nodes belonging to a smaller
square form a group among themselves. All the groups
contain two types of nodes viz. ordinary and nodes. A
node within a group can make direct communication
to any other node in the same group or region. Nodes
belonging to two different group communicate via spe-
cial nodes called nodes. These nodes are more resourceful
than ordinary nodes in terms of memory, computational
power, and energy.We used two types of different key pre-
distribution schemes for this deployment. The ordinary
sensor nodes and the node within a group use symmetric
design-based key predistribution scheme proposed in [6]
for within group communication. The nodes contain two
types of keys. It can communicate to other sensor nodes
belonging to the same group. Moreover, it can commu-
nicate with other nodes by means of a separate key pre-
distribution scheme. Our scheme offers better resiliency
than other existing schemes like the most notable scheme
by Ruj & Roy [18] and the Zhou et al. scheme in [23].
Table 8 Comparison of schemes with respect to type of deployment, node, communication, and storage overhead and
scalability
Schemes Deployment Nodes Communication cost Storage Scalability
DDHV [20,21] Grid-group Homogeneous O(1) O(1) Scalable
LN [39,40] Grid Homogeneous O(logN) O(
√
N) Not scalable
YG [28,29] Grid-group Homogeneous O(1) O(1) Not scalable
ZNR [23] Group Heterogeneous O(logN) O(N/g)a Not scalable
O(N)b
HMMH [24] Grid-group Homogeneous O(1) O(
√
N) Scalable
HM [25] Grid-group Homogeneous O(1) O(
√
N) Scalable
PIKE [26] Grid Homogeneous O(logN) O(
√
N) Not scalable
SLW [27]-2 Grid-group Heterogeneous O(logN) O(
√
N/g) Scalable
Ruj-Roy [18] Grid-group Heterogeneous O(logN) O(N
1




Current scheme Grid-group Heterogeneous O(logN) O(N
1




Here, N is the total number of sensors in the network. g is the number of groups in the network. athe storage for small sensor nodes, and b the storage for agents.
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We have shown that our scheme ensures that there will
be high probability of existence of a common unexposed
link between two nodes belonging to two different groups
even if a considerable number of nodes are compromised
by the adversary.
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